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Abstract 
 
We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind.  The 
challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for 
their systematic nature.  There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with 
adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to 
be.  There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false 
belief tests.  We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can 
answer these challenges. 
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 Saxe (2005) challenges Simulation Theory of Mind (ST) by noting occasional systematic error 
when persons assess the mental states of others.  On her view, these errors are more easily explained by 
Theory Theory of Mind (TT) than by ST.  She allows that ST could explain the existence of errors, but 
denies that it can explain the different types of error that reliably occur in different circumstances.  Her 
question is a good one, and we will be taking it seriously in this paper. 
 We agree that while mindreading abilities have many successes, there are also many failures of 
prediction.  We also agree that these errors in mindreading are systematic in nature, with many 
participants making the same errors in the same circumstances.  For example, adults often exaggerate 
the extent to which people hold the same beliefs that they do, and 4-year-old children seem to assimilate 
ignorance to error.  Saxe does allow the ‘wrong inputs’ defence of these errors – the claim that error in 
the simulation comes about because the inputs to the simulation were wrong.  Saxe’s challenge though 
is that the wrong inputs defence cannot account for the systematic nature of the errors.  The fact that 
children systematically say that someone who does not know something will have a false belief about 
it, rather than not know it, is held by Saxe to comport more happily with a TT line.  The line is that 
children use a false theoretical lemma – ‘ignorance means you get it wrong’.  That line, according to 
Saxe, is not open to ST – one might think that the errors should be random or at least less one-sided if 
simulation abilities grounded mindreading capacities.   
 The lack of any substantial response from the ST side to Saxe’s clear and comprehensive paper 
has partly driven an emerging consensus for a hybrid view involving both ST and TT.  For example, 
Apperly writes that ‘many authors now argue for a hybrid account in which both Simulation and Theory 
play a role’ (Apperly, 2008).  Apperly supports his view by noting that ‘cases where people make 
systematic errors [...] are seen by many as good evidence’ for TT, and gives only two citations, of which 
Saxe (2005) is one.  Similarly, Morin (p. 1069, 2007) writes that ‘ST is largely accepted in the literature 
(but see Saxe, 2005)’.  In sum, as Doherty (p. 47, 2008) points out, the ‘  ‘‘argument from error’’ is one 
of the most powerful arguments against’ ST.  The lack of a response to Saxe (2005), then, has driven 
this emerging hybrid consensus.  In this paper, we will supply this response. 
 Saxe uses evidence from both adults and children to make her case.  The adult data comes from 
decades of research in social psychology, where participants systematically make errors in assessing 
and evaluating the mental states of others.  Our response will be that bias mismatch can supply the 
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missing element to ST which can explain the systematic nature of these errors.  It is well-known from 
psychological research that persons exhibit many errors in their reasoning due to cognitive biases, such 
as Confirmation Bias and the use of the Availability Heuristic.  There are several types of Confirmation 
Bias; for example, one might seek only information tending to confirm a hypothesis.  The Availability 
Heuristic is applied when someone ‘evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by 
availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1972).  We propose that simulation of others does not include simulation of their cognitive biases, which 
is why there can be systematic errors in mindreading.  One reason they do not include these biases in 
their simulations is that they are less exposed to the emotional impact of the situation than the persons 
being simulated.  Another possibility is that they are using different systems of reasoning.  It is widely 
accepted that there are two systems of reasoning; one is `quick and dirty' while the other is slower and 
more rational (Sloman, 1996).  If the person being simulated and the person doing the simulation are 
using different systems, there will likely be ToM errors.  So in this way also, we respond to Saxe’s 
challenge by employing a variant of the wrong inputs defence. 
 Saxe’s second source of evidence is developmental, where the data suggest that young children 
do not differentiate between ‘not knowing’ and ‘getting it wrong’ (Ruffman, 1996).  Our response here 
is different to the one we will use with the adult data.  Rather than propose a problem with modelling 
bias, we show that the Ruffman data can be explained by a simulationist account coupled with 
development in processing capacity. 
 In what follows, we first outline some of the situations cited by Saxe (2005) where there is 
systematic error in theory of mind and explain how failure to model these cognitive biases explains the 
errors.  Saxe suggests a number of relevant circumstances.  In some situations, persons are not cynical 
enough about the reasoning capacities of others and in other situations we are too cynical.  In other 
words, persons sometimes expect too much in the way of rationality and logic from others and 
sometimes too little.  We will show how bias mismatch driven by emotional or affective mismatch 
explains the errors made.  In the second part of the paper, we will consider Saxe’s developmental claim 
that the way that children confuse ignorance with error is difficult to explain on ST.  Throughout the 
paper, we will use the term ‘S’ to refer to the subject who is using Theory of Mind abilities to mind-
read a target individual ‘O’, who is the object of Theory of Mind abilities. 
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1: Theory of Mind: Not Cynical Enough 
 Saxe (2005) claims that adults believe that they and others are more rational and logical than 
they are; they are ‘not cynical enough’ when they mindread.  One useful citation for Saxe is the 
notorious Milgram (1963) study.  She writes: ‘if we could accurately simulate other minds, half a 
century of social psychology would lose much of its power to shock and thrill. [...] The experiments of 
Milgram [...] are famous because there is a specific, and vivid, mismatch between what we confidently 
expect, and what the [Os] actually do’ (Milgram, 1963, p. 177).  Similarly, she claims that ‘we share the 
conviction that, in general, beliefs follow from relatively dispassionate assessment of facts-of-the-
matter and logical reasoning.  As a consequence, people’s expectations of how they and others should 
reason and behave, correspond more closely to normative theories of logic, probability and utility, than 
to their actual subsequent behaviour’ (Saxe, 2005, p. 176).  This then, is an error of mindreading – 
systematically over-rating how closely our behaviour, and that of others, reflects optimal reasoning. 
 Saxe backs this claim by citing Gilovich (1993).  Gilovich’s work is primarily about first order 
errors: errors of logic and reasoning that people make and the reasons they make those errors.  Saxe’s 
question is about errors in mindreading – the second order errors that people make about the first order 
errors that other people make.  However, since Gilovich’s whole thrust is that the prevalence of first 
order errors that people make when they hold ‘questionable’ beliefs is surprising, some discussion of 
his work is useful here.  The basic project of the book is to ask why ‘questionable and erroneous beliefs 
are learned, and how they are maintained’ (Gilovich, 1993, pp. 9-10).  The maintenance of these false 
beliefs is of interest to us, since one might expect confrontation with evidence to remove them.  To the 
extent that this does not happen, while persons predict that it will, then we have a second order error of 
mindreading that we want to consider.  We will not be able to explain away these second order errors 
by positing unexpected lack of cognitive ability or exposure to evidence as explanations of the first 
order errors: as Gilovich goes on to note: ‘[e]rroneous beliefs plague both experienced professionals 
and less informed laypeople alike’ (p. 10). 
 We are also interested in the biases that Gilovich cites as explanations of the false beliefs that 
people hold, because our proposal is that absence of specifically those biases in S at the time of the 
simulation and as part of the simulation is what accounts for the surprise and the errors in mindreading.  
Naturally we do not claim that S is free of the biases displayed by O; merely that the relevant biases are 
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not triggered in S or used as part of the simulation because S is not actually in O’s situation with its 
affective import.  Many first order errors, Gilovich writes, ‘can be traced to imperfections in our 
capacities to process information and draw conclusions’ (p. 10).  We will argue that these imperfections 
are not simulated.  In what follows we will outline the studies used by Saxe to support her argument, 
but additionally we also focus on data relevant to second order errors.  That is, errors of mindreading. 
1.1 Unexpected Willingness to Shock 
 Milgram’s (1963) experiment involved deceiving participants (the Os) into thinking that they 
were aiding the experimenter in testing how well students learnt word pairs.  The Os were told to apply 
an electric shock to the student if the student made a mistake.  The students were in fact confederates 
of the experimenter and did not receive any shocks.  However, participants believed they were 
administering shocks ranging from ‘moderate’ through ‘intense’ to ‘danger: severe shock’ and beyond 
to the mysterious ‘XXX’ category.  The various pretended shocks were accompanied by increasing signs 
of distress from the student confederates.  The surprising results were that 26 of the 40 participants 
obeyed the orders of the experimenter to the end, applying the strongest shock available. 
 We now come to the evidence relevant to errors in mindreading.  Milgram writes: ‘[f]ourteen 
Yale seniors, all psychology majors, were provided with a detailed description of the experimental 
situation.  They were asked to reflect carefully on it and to predict the behaviour of 100 hypothetical 
[Os]. [...]  All respondents predicted that only an insignificant minority would go through to the end of 
the shock series. (The estimates ranged from 0 to 3%; i.e., the most “pessimistic” member of the class 
predicted that of 100 persons, 3 would continue through to the most potent shock available on the shock 
generator – 450 volts’ (p. 375). 
 The defence of ST that we propose must now explain this failure to predict actual performance.  
The answer, we suggest lies in the substantial affective mismatch between S and O.  The Ss, whether 
ourselves or Yale seniors, when considering the question as to how much participants would be prepared 
to shock are in a relatively calm, reflective state – we/they are able to ‘reflect carefully’.  The Ss are not 
this instant under pressure from an authority figure in a white coat, issuing stringent instructions.  We 
may even imagine that the stress deriving from deference to authority would be much less in modern 
times than in 1963.  All of these factors imply that we are unlikely to apply, or to simulate, the cognitive 
bias that tends to make us more obedient than we should be.   
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 In addition, note that Ss are given the salient facts and asked to opine on them rationally, which 
differs from the position of the Os, who simply experience the world without the important, salient or 
significant facts being given to them as such.  Nothing about the calmness and lack of involvement of 
the Ss is true of the Os.  As Milgram writes, many of the Os exhibited extreme affect: ‘the degree of 
tension reached extremes that are rarely seen in socio-psychological laboratory studies. [...] Fourteen of 
the 40 [Os] showed definite signs of nervous laughter and smiling [...] Full-blown, uncontrollable 
seizures were observed for 3 [Os]’ (p. 375). 
 There is then a very clear affective mismatch between S and O.  This, we suggest, explains the 
absence of the appropriate bias in the simulation which, in turn, explains the systematic failure of 
mindreading.  Milgram even provides this interpretation: ‘it is possible that the remoteness of the 
respondents from the actual situation, and the difficulty of conveying to them the concrete details of the 
experiment, could account for the serious underestimation of obedience’ (pp. 375-376).  Our 
explanation however must in addition account for a further intriguing element of failure of ST also 
described.  Milgram had hidden Ss, final year psychology undergraduates, watching the experiment and 
fully aware that the shocks were pretend.  Still, these Ss ‘often uttered expressions of disbelief upon 
seeing an experimental participant administer more powerful shocks to the victim’ even though the Ss 
‘had a full acquaintance with the details of the situation’ (p. 377).  These hidden Ss were still not subject 
to the bias towards obeying the instructions of the experimenter to administer the ‘shocks’.  They faced 
much less pressure and affect than the experimental participants, the Os.  The affective mismatch 
between S and O creates a bias mismatch between S and O.  This explains the simulation failure by S 
in relation to O. 
 The particular bias involved here is the Conformity Bias, also known as the Asch Effect (Asch, 
1952).  Conformity Bias, put simply, is our tendency to do what we are told.  More formally, Prentice 
(2007, p. 18) gives the following definition: ``conformity bias strongly pushes people to conform their 
judgments to the judgments of their reference group''.  Here, the relevant `reference group' for O is the 
authoritative figure of the experimenter who is urging the O to give the electric shocks.  By so urging, 
the experimenter suggests to the O that the giving of the shocks is `normal behaviour' and that the 
acceptability of giving the shocks is the judgment of the reference group.  O demonstrates Conformity 
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Bias in agreeing to apply the shocks.  S does not share the affective involvement of O, and therefore 
omits the Conformity Bias of O in his simulation of O, leading to systematic ToM error. 
1.2 Unexpected Belief in Agreement 
 Gilovich (1993) also includes some evidence of the ‘false consensus effect’ which Saxe uses to 
support her position.  We might expect that people will generally believe that other people agree with 
them only when there is some reason for that belief, for example testimony to that effect or perhaps 
polling data.  However, Gilovich points out that there is a ‘systematic defect in our ability to estimate 
the beliefs and attitudes of others’ whereby persons ‘often exaggerate the extent to which other people 
hold the same beliefs that [they] do’ (pp. 112-113).  This is evidence for a failure in mindreading because 
if people simulated accurately, they would not predict the presence of this support where it is absent.  
  
 Gilovich (and Saxe) cite data from Ross et al. (1977).  Students were asked if they would be 
prepared to wear a large sign around campus bearing the legend ‘REPENT’.  Many agreed.  These 
students were then asked the critical question as to what percentage of their fellow students they thought 
would also agree to do so.  It transpires that students thought that their peers would decide roughly as 
they had.  Gilovich (1993) reports that ‘[t]hose who agreed to wear the sign thought that 60% would do 
so, whereas those who refused thought that only 27% would agree to wear it’ (p. 114).  This is an error 
of mindreading of exactly the sort used by Saxe to support her argument.  However, we would argue 
that such data in fact speak against Saxe’s position.  The error is basically that of thinking that others 
are more like oneself than they are.  What could be stronger evidence for ST?  Furthermore, of special 
interest to us is Gilovich’s explanation for the false consensus effect.  He claims that a basic desire is to 
‘maintain a positive assessment of our own judgment’ which is particularly likely to play a part when 
we ‘have an emotional investment in the belief’ (p. 114).  That is, persons wish to believe that they are 
highly skilled at making judgments of all kinds and they will as a consequence tend to think that have 
penetrated to the truth of a matter; this truth then will be what others hold as well in their view.  This is 
exactly what one would predict according to our view: since the S has no affective investment in the 
beliefs of O, S commits a mindreading error by not simulating the resultant false consensus effect and 
the consequent errors of O. 
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 At this point, it might be objected that the Ross et al (1977) data could as well be explained by 
TT as by ST.  The TT proponent could postulate an incorrect theoretical axiom in ToM, to the effect 
that `others (mostly) believe what I believe'.  Our initial response to this is dialectical to the effect that 
even if true, our explanation of the data has value as a `weak defence'.  As far as we know, ST propo-
nents have offered no response at all in print to the charge that ST cannot account for such systematic 
errors as exemplified in experiments on the false consensus effect and so we feel it is valuable that we 
have provided one. 
 Beyond this, however, we can offer a `strong defence' with the import that ST provides not just 
an explanation of the data, but a better explanation that TT.  One argument for this relies on exposing 
what we call the `setting the bar too low error'.  This error involves making the false assumption that if 
a ToM exercise can be described in theoretical terms, then it perforce was in fact conducted theoretically.  
This is like assuming that because I get the same answer every time I simulate my feelings on hearing 
of the rejection of my paper, I must have a theoretical axiom relating paper rejection and emotional 
states. 
 Secondly, we note that ST provides a more parsimonious explanation of the false consensus 
effect than TT.  In fact, ST barely needs to explain the effect at all since it is a natural outcome of 
simulation that there is `default belief attribution' viz., since S starts from his own state in simulating O, 
the simulation begins with O held as believing everything S believes.  TT may have an axiom to perform 
default belief attribution, but the simplicity of the axiom would not be paralleled by simplicity of im-
plementation.  In fact the implementation of such an axiom would be very complicated.  Nichols and 
Stich (2003, p. 107) have ably pressed this objection against TT.  They note that it would ``generate 
chaos if the model also contained most of [S's] own beliefs, since some of those beliefs will be incom-
patible with the discrepant beliefs of [O]''.  For more on both of these arguments, see Short (forthcom-
ing). 
 A further objection suggests that that our account over-generalises.  The objection starts from 
the idea that people want to keep beliefs which are central for their self-image.  We agree that this is 
the case and that there are good arguments around self-serving biases for self-deception to this effect 
(Mele, 2001).  The claim is that we do not exercise such biased belief retention all the time but only 
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quite selectively. Thus, the objection runs, our account tends to generalize too much some phenomena 
which are reported in the literature but are not universal. 
 Our response is to note that we are merely accounting for literature that the TT camp has cited 
in support of its position, and we need not solely in virtue thereof be committed to any further claims 
about other circumstances.  We seek only to provide ST with a response to the charge that it cannot 
explain such examples of systematic error, and by appealing to a bias mismatch, we have done so. 
Whether the effect is seen frequently or infrequently, it is described in the literature and we explain the 
ToM errors seen in that literature, no more and no less.  S does not simulate the false consensus effect 
in O and therefore makes a ToM error about O only when the effect operates in O.  We explain on a 
simulationist basis what happens whenever this particular error occurs.  It is worth noting here that this 
objection equally applies to TT.  The TT explanation of ToM error is to say that a false axiom has been 
employed, and that whenever such a false axiom is employed, ToM errors will result.  TT is more prone 
to over-generalisation than the ST account. 
1.3 Unexpected Belief Perseverance 
 Saxe cites Stich and Nichols (1995) who describe an experiment by Ross et al. (1975) on what 
we may term the Belief Perseverance Bias. In their paper, Ross et al. note that ‘once formed, impressions 
are remarkably perseverant and unresponsive to new input’ (p. 880).  Os were given a test which 
suggested that they were unusually good (or bad) at a certain task.  Later it was explained to them that 
the test was bogus.  The surprising finding is that Os continued to believe that they were good or bad at 
the task even when the evidence for that belief had been dismissed.   Following on from this study, Stich 
and Nichols formed a body of Ss from among their students and asked them to predict the results of the 
study.  They found that the Ss predictions were more often wrong than right – students often assumed 
that people’s beliefs would change in the light of the bogus test data.  Thus there is evidence for 
systematic error (or failure) in mindreading. 
 Stich and Nichols adduce this failure as evidence against ST by noting that the students would 
have exhibited the belief perseverance effect had they taken the test as opposed to being asked to predict 
its outcome.  Had they been simulating, they would not have made the error, according to Stich and 
Nichols.  This is of course easily explained on the view we are proposing.  The S's simulations failed 
because they failed to include the belief perseverance effect in their simulation.  They failed to include 
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that effect because they were not in the situation faced by the Os, who had an affective component 
resulting from being told something about their competencies which may have been pleasing or 
displeasing.  The experimental task in the Ross et al. study was to detect which is real when presented 
with one real and one fictitious suicide note while wired up to electrodes ostensibly intended to measure 
physiological responses.  We may observe immediately that this is not a low affect scenario for the Os.  
In addition, the Os were randomly assigned to three groups – success, fail, average – and we can 
conjecture that membership of at least two of these groups will have had some influence on self-esteem 
and the associated affective component.  This is confirmed by Ross et al. who note that ‘subjects in the 
success condition reported having felt more satisfaction than subjects in the average condition’ (p. 883) 
who in turn felt more satisfaction than the subjects assigned to the fail condition.   
 If the situation of the Ss is made sufficiently similar to that of the Os, then they will exhibit the 
same bias.  This is what Ross et al. did when they recruited additional experimental subjects who were 
engaged in observing and listening to a whole experiment through a one-way mirror.  They also 
exhibited the Belief Perseverance Effect about the ability of the Os.  That is, they continued to believe 
that the Os in the success group were better at the task even after they had learned that the Os did not 
really succeed.  When Stich and Nichols find that their students are ‘more often wrong than right’, they 
are polling a group of Ss in a very different affective scenario.  The effective aim of Stich and Nichols’s 
student poll may be paraphrased as asking the students whether they would continue to believe a claim 
about themselves after evidence for it was removed.  People would feel quite silly affirming that. 
 
2 Theory of Mind: Too Cynical 
 Saxe cites experimental data to show that spouses believe that their partners will be more self-
serving than they are.  That is, spouses are ‘too cynical’ about how self-serving their partners will be.  
This opposed direction of error from the ‘not cynical enough’ error discussed above illustrates Saxe’s 
challenge: defenders of ST must explain this directionality of error as well as the possibility of error.  
Saxe (2005) cites work by Kruger and Gilovich (1995).  Each member of a married couple were asked, 
separately, to rate how often he or she was responsible for common desirable and undesirable events in 
the marriage. They were also asked to predict how their spouse would assign responsibility.  Each 
predicted that their spouse would be self-serving – taking more responsibility for good events, and less 
responsibility for bad events.  Saxe then concludes that ‘whereas reasoning about reasoning is usually 
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characterised by overly optimistic expectations about people’s rationality, in specific circumstances [...] 
Ss are overly pessimistic, an effect dubbed ‘naive cynicism’ (Saxe, 2005, p. 177). 
 The data actually reported by Kruger and Gilovich are more complex than this and Saxe is over-
simplifying to say that the partners were self-serving.  In fact, Kruger and Gilovich canvass an alternate 
explanation, based on the surprising observation that Os also overstate their own contribution to 
negative events as well as positive ones.  The alternate explanation is the well-known Availability 
Heuristic whereby salient explanations are preferred to other ones not because they are a better fit to 
the explananda, but simply because they are more available.  This factor, when added to the fact that 
people remember their own activities more easily than those of others, means that people are likely to 
claim more responsibility for both positive and negative events than is warranted.  As Kruger and 
Gilovich point out this should lead to accuracy and error of different types in assessment of the bias of 
others: Ss ‘may be surprised to find that others often claim too much responsibility for [negative] 
activities as well’ (p. 744).  This can clearly be explained though on the proposal for which we have 
been arguing.  The Ss failed to model accurately the effects of the Availability Heuristic.  The affective 
mismatch which drives the inaccurate modelling of the Availability Heuristic is more difficult to spot 
here, though it might be driven by the underlying emotional impact of being asked to comment on one’s 
marriage.  That situation may well be emotionally involving and call to mind both difficult times and 
easier ones. 
 Kruger and Gilovich also find that undergraduates, asked to predict the results of the above 
study, exhibit the same effect: i.e., they also expect the married couples to be self-serving in their 
allocations of responsibility. Importantly, the undergraduates were asked why they gave the assessments 
they did.  The explanation they gave were more consistent with a self-serving account than an 
Availability Heuristic account.  For example, ‘(83%) articulated a theory of motivated bias for at least 
one of the [positive or negative] activities’ (Kruger and Gilovich, 1999, p. 746).  Holding a theory of 
motivated bias means that the undergraduates said they expected people to make statements in the 
direction that would make those people look good. One interpretation of this is that the undergraduate 
Ss were not simulating the Availability Heuristic in the Os.  The participants in the marriages were 
subject to one bias – the Availability Heuristic – and this was not modelled adequately by the Ss.  It will 
also be clear that the affective mismatch explanation for this missing bias is available here as it was 
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previously, since commenting on a marriage in which one is a participant has higher emotional impact 
than commenting on one not involving oneself.  Many events within a marriage will take on a higher 
level of emotional importance than would be predicted by Ss or even perhaps by the Os themselves 
when they reflect on their behaviour in a calmer later period. 
 Kruger and Gilovich consider the exact question Saxe raises: when do people make the switch 
from naive cynicism to naive realism?  In other words, what principled account can be given to explain 
when people make this type of error and when they do not?  The authors conclude: ‘the naive cynicism 
we have documented here applies to people’s intuitions about the judgments of individuals who are 
seen as having a vested interest in the matter at hand’ (p. 752).  So again we have affect mismatch 
between S and O: O is seen as emotionally committed while S is not. 
2.1 Interim Summary of the adult data 
 Our task in this paper has been to supply ST with a response to the claims that it cannot account 
for some literature detailing systematic ToM error.  We have identified a bias in each case, suggested 
that it is not simulated leading to a bias mismatch in these specific circumstances.  Before going on to 
deal with Saxe’s claims based on developmental data, we first address some questions raised by one of 
the anonymous reviewers. 
 It might be objected that there can be ToM errors in circumstances where there does not appear 
to be a great deal of affective difference between S and O.  We agree, but can only briefly sketch here 
a second reason for bias mismatch.  [See Short (2015) for much more on this.]  The idea is that there 
can also be system mismatch.  Sloman (1996) and others have proposed that there are two systems of 
reasoning.  System 1 is quick and dirty, and may be termed intuitive and the slower and more rational 
System 2 is reflective.  The basic idea of system mismatch is that if S and O are using different systems 
of reasoning then there will likely be ToM error.  For example, if S reflectively and carefully simulates 
O's reasoning in a scenario where O has employed quick System 1 reasoning, S will likely make a 
wrong prediction about O's behaviour.  By contrast, if S and O both employ the same system of reason-
ing, then there are good prospects of S avoiding ToM error and making a successful prediction of O's 
behaviour. 
 A further objection might be based on the idea that our view denies that S's sometimes account 
for the relevant informational basis of O's as basis of the understanding of O's.  In fact, we do not deny 
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this.  Such informational changes to S's belief set to account for the different information held by O will 
often be essential to successful simulation.  The simulationist account of this would be roughly as fol-
lows.  If S  is simulating an O with no relevant informational differences to S, as far as S knows, then 
S can safely predict O's behaviour on the basis of S's simulated behaviour.  Making changes to account 
for O's different information, where relevant to the particular behaviour in question, is an important part 
of getting the simulation right.  In fact, the objection to TT of Stich and Nichols (2003) which we 
mentioned earlier bears on this point.  Stich and Nichols argue persuasively that specifying a set of 
axioms under TT to account for belief differences between S and O would be difficult.  Under ST, S 
can start from assigning O the same belief set as S has and then adjust it.  ToM questions such as ‘would 
I enter the coffee shop because I have a desire for coffee even though I believe that I have no money?’ 
become easily answerable.  S is thus enabled to predict a circumstance in which O will not enter the 
coffee shop, even when O desires coffee, and even when S knows that S has money. 
 It might be also objected that our account entails that no biases are ever simulated.  This would 
be a serious objection were we committed to it.  We are not however.  Consider an example from Michel 
and Newen (2010) about the egocentric bias in belief formation, whereby individuals engage in self-
deception to bolster their self-esteem.  We agree that if S's never accounted for such biases, ToM would 
rarely be successful, which is clearly not the case.  It also looks implausible just from everyday experi-
ence: many of us are familiar with the experience of imagining the reaction to some success of a rather 
pompous academic colleague who has an unrealistic and inflated sense of his own capabilities.  A select 
few may even have some insight into their own tendencies in this direction. 
 Beyond this, we also point out bias matching can lead to successful simulation and successful 
ToM.  We can form a picture of this in the egocentric bias case which provided the basis of this objection.  
Imagine that S knows he is rather prone to self-deception in relation to his abilities in chess. [More 
plausibly perhaps, imagine S knows of someone else who has this proneness.]  This will assist S in 
simulating the pompous academic O, even if S is himself free of that particular instantiation of egocen-
tric bias.  S can simply predict that O will be somewhat overly positive about himself in relation to that 
topic and not necessarily about other topics. 
 Again, it is important to avoid the ‘setting the bar too low’ error here as always.  Neither the 
TT or the hybrid causes are supported by finding an episode of ToM operation which can be described 
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in theoretical terms, since the fact that a process can be described using an axiom does not mean that 
that axiom or any other was employed in conduct of that process. 
 
3 Children’s Assimilation of Ignorance to Error 
 Saxe (2005) also cites experimental data showing a mindreading error in children.  We will 
begin by describing her challenge before using the approach to mindreading called adaptive modelling 
proposed by Peterson and Riggs (1999) to respond to it. 
 Saxe reports an experiment by Ruffman (1996) suggesting that four-year-olds do not 
differentiate ‘not knowing’ from ‘getting it wrong’.  In one experiment, a child and a doll (A) are seated 
in front of two dishes of sweets. The round dish contains red and green sweets, but the square dish 
contains only yellow sweets.  The child and the doll watch while a sweet from the round dish is moved 
into an opaque bag.  Although the child knows that the chosen sweet was green, the doll does not.  
Children are then asked ‘what colour does the doll think the sweet in the bag is?’ The correct answer is 
that the doll does not know or that the doll thinks it is either red or green.  Children report that the doll 
thinks the sweet is red.  Ruffman concludes that children found it easier to ascribe a false belief (the 
sweet is red) than to ascribe a true belief (the sweet is green) and this is contrary to the predictions of 
ST.  Thus on his view, the child simulates using his or her own beliefs as a basis for prediction.  If the 
child believes, correctly, that the sweet in the box is green, then using their own belief state as an input 
they should find it easier to ascribe true belief to the doll, since the child has that same true belief.   
 Saxe concludes that ‘the actual result is best explained by an inaccurate generalisation in the 
child’s developing theory of mind: ‘ignorance means you get it wrong’. Because A is ignorant of which 
sweet was chosen from the round dish, A must think that it was the wrong colour, a red one’ (p. 175).  
Saxe claims that the data can explained by TT but not by ST since it is an example of the application of 
a false theoretical lemma ‘if X is the case and one does not know whether X is the case, then one 
believes not-X’.  Saxe’s general challenge here is why the children fail to model the doll correctly, viz., 
why they wrongly simulate the doll as being wrong rather than ignorant i.e., with a chance of being 
fortuitously right. 
3.1 Unadapted Modelling Process 
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 Saxe’s challenge does have a response though, using the model proposed by Peterson and Riggs 
(1999).  This model was put forward to explain mindreading performance of 3 and 4 year olds in the 
false belief task.  Their approach was to devise models (or databases) of the key events / facts concerning 
the false belief scenario; one model for the child, and one model simulated by the child of the protagonist. 
 With regard to the Ruffman task, we can represent the child’s model or database as follows; 
  Query: What colour is the sweet? 
  Fact: The sweet came from the round bowl (either it is red or it is green) 
  Fact: The sweet was green 
 When asked what colour is the sweet the child can consult her model and read off the answer 
‘green’ to the query. 
3.2 Adapted Modelling Process 
 We now set out how the database needs to be modified for the child to simulate the doll's 
database. Recall that Saxe’s challenge here is to explain why children systematically assimilate 
ignorance to error.  That is, why the child will usually say that the doll will say that it is red, when a 
better answer would be to say that the doll does not know. 
 The key point of the Peterson and Riggs proposal is that mind-reading in a false belief task is 
accomplished by i) identifying the thing which the protagonist does not know and then ii) implementing 
this as an ‘ignore’ instruction in one’s own system.  The doll is the protagonist.  What does the doll not 
know?  It does not know that the sweet is green. This gives us the following simulated database (or 
adapted model). 
  Query: What colour is the sweet?   
  Fact: The sweet was from the round bowl (either it is red or it is green) 
  Fact: The sweet was green 
  Ignore (Fact: The sweet was green) 
 To produce this database the child has had to inhibit the fact that the sweet was green.  In other 
words cognitive control was required to simulate the doll’s model.  Now we come to the question asked 
of the child – what colour does the doll think the sweet is?  To answer this query the child consults the 
modified database.  However, this does not give a single solution, because the doll only knows only that 
the sweet came from the round bowl – that it is either red or green.  There are now three options – to 
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say that the doll thinks the sweet is red or to say that the doll thinks the sweet is green, or to say that the 
doll thinks the sweet is either red or green.  But here is where a second consequence of the ignore 
instruction comes into play, and it does so deleteriously from the perspective of mindreading capacities.  
The child has already suppressed the fact that the sweet is green.  Therefore, the only option available 
is to respond that the sweet was red.  Thus we explain why the child wrongly answers that the doll 
thinks the sweet is red without appealing to the theoretical lemma ‘ignorance means you get it wrong’. 
 Based on this analysis we can then hypothesise that as mindreading abilities develop, the ignore 
instruction can be imposed selectively.  It should be used to simulate the doll’s knowledge base.  But, 
if the ignore instruction is also used as a response inhibitor to the question ‘what colour does the doll 
think the sweet is?’, then the child makes the error Ruffman reports. 
 Ruffman also makes a point on inputs which is helpful for our case.  It brings out that our 
defence can be seen as not a wrong inputs defence, but a wrong processing defence.  Our claim is that 
children improve in processing ability, not the ability to process the right inputs.  Ruffman claims that 
the observation that children assimilate error to ignorance is more congenial to TT than ST because 
‘children were generally good at ‘inputting’ or taking account of the relevant information (i.e. the [...] 
knowledge of the sweets’ colours’.  (p. 388).  This exposes a useful ambiguity in what is meant by an 
‘input’.  By ‘input’, Ruffman means raw data gathered from the senses, such as might be expressed in 
the proposition ‘the sweet is green’.  In contrast, by ‘input’, we understand ‘input to the simulation’, 
which of course is what matters for understanding the results of that simulation.  Our view allows that 
simulation takes place by changing the inputs, changing the processing on those inputs, changing the 
outputs, or some combination of those three factors. 
 An additional merit of our account is that we can now understand why the developing ability to 
simulate will handle ascriptions of true belief and false belief before it can handle ascriptions of 
ignorance.  Both TT and ST allow, as they must, for improving Theory of Mind abilities as development 
progresses.  They predict different sorts of development however.  For Saxe (2005), development would 
consist in abandoning the mistaken assimilation of ignorance to error.  On our ST view by contrast, the 
change would be due to an improved ability to take the perspective of another, including the ability to 
ascribe ‘ignorance’ to them, driven by changes in cognitive control.  Note how difficult this might be.  
Children can more easily simulate true and false belief because these beliefs derive from their own 
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perspective – they have first-hand experience of their false beliefs.  To ascribe ignorance, they need to 
become aware, in a meta-belief, that there are propositions about which they do not have a true or a 
false belief – or about which they have no belief.  In other words, they are ignorant of some data which 
would give warrant to asserting or denying some proposition.  This is more complex than the assessment 
of truth or falsity, and will therefore result in a developmental lag. 
 In conclusion: we have shown that ST can explain systematic Theory of Mind errors in both 
adults and children, contrary to Saxe’s claims. 
Timothy L. Short 
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